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Abstract
This paper integrates into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic pro-
cess of individual ageing. The novel approach enables us to investigate the interaction
between health and retirement policy in order to quantitatively characterize the op-
timal joint design of the social insurance system today and in response to future
medical progress, and its implications for health inequality. Calibrating our model
to Germany, we nd that currently the public health and pension system is approxi-
mately optimal. Future progress in medical technology calls for a potentially drastic
increase in health spending that typically shall be accompanied with a lower pension
savings rate and a higher retirement age. Medical progress and higher health spending
is predicted to lead to more health inequality.
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1 Introduction
Life expectancy of adults increased by around 15 years over the 20th century and many
researchers in demography and the natural sciences consider it likely to increase further
(e.g. Gavrilov and Gavrilova, 1992; Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002). The development was to
a large extent driven by fast advances in medical and pharmaceutical research that led to
substantial increases in the eectiveness of health spending on the ageing process.1 Through
this channel, health spending contributes to the widely discussed problem of social security
systems, namely that pension payments are likely to decline for a given pension savings
rate unless the statutory retirement age is changed. This implies that health and pension
policy shall be examined and designed jointly.
Higher eectiveness of medical technology may make higher contribution rates to public
health insurance more desirable in order to better reap the benets in terms of improved
health and higher life expectancy. Its adverse eect on pension payments could be oset by
raising contributions to the pension system as well. There is, however, a trade-o between
the two tiers of the social insurance system, as higher contributions to pension insurance and
health insurance both reduce net income in the working period, for a given labor supply and
because of a reduction in labor supply. Alternatively, it could be desirable to increase the
retirement age along with an increase in health spending. In view of the complex linkages
between the pension system and the health care system created by the endogeneity of human
health and longevity, the jointly optimal design of our social insurance systems appears to
be both important and a priori non-obvious.
This paper investigates the interactions between public health and pension policy in
order to quantitatively characterize the optimal joint design of the social insurance system
today and in response to future medical progress. In line with a long tradition in public
economics to justify social systems, we focus on welfare maximization behind the veil of
ignorance. It is based on the idea that an ex ante identical population would agree on a
1Medical and pharmaceutical innovations became important drivers of life expectancy from the 1950s
onwards. Before that, life expectancy rose predominantly because of decreases in child mortality rather
than because of increases in life expectancy of adults (e.g. Milligan and Wise, 2011). In the US, the fraction
of the population which is at least 65 years old is projected to be 18.8 percent in 2025, whereas it was 8.1
percent in 1950 (Poterba, 2014).
1
social insurance system which reduces the probability of illness and insures against social
hardships and long life. An interesting, related question is whether implementing an ex
ante optimal health care system will reduce health inequality within a society compared to
the status quo. In fact, reducing health inequality is a major goal of large organizations
like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Union (EU).2 It is, however,
non-obvious whether it is line or in conict with the goal to maximize ex ante welfare.
Our key innovation which enables us to examine these issues is to integrate into public
economics a biologically founded process of individual ageing. Ageing is understood as
the stochastic and individual-specic deterioration of the functioning of body and mind  
represented by an accumulation of health decits   that eventually culminates in death
(Arking, 2006; Masoro, 2006). Our approach is based on empirical evidence from gerontol-
ogy3 which suggests that (i) at any given age, the number of health decits is approximately
Poisson-distributed in the population, (ii) the average number of individual health decits
grows with age, and (iii) the probability of death strongly depends on the number of health
decits an individual has accumulated over time (Mitnitski and Rockwood, 2002a, 2002b,
2005).
A salient feature of our analysis is that, insofar as health expenditures targeted to
the working-aged aect the distribution of health decits in this group, they also aect
the distribution of health decits among retirees. Consequently, improving health of the
working-aged raises life expectancy for individuals at retirement age and ceteris paribus
reduces pension payments. It also raises the productivity of workers and their contributions
to the social insurance system, with positive eects on pension payments. Accordingly, we
distinguish health care expenses for the working-aged from health expenditure targeted
to typical illnesses of the elderly. Examples of the former would be expenses for mass
examinations of the health status of pupils at schools, costs for educational health campaigns
2See www.who.int and www.health-inequalities.eu/. According to the WHO, health inequality is dened
as \dierences in health status or in the distribution of health determinants between dierent population
groups".
3Modern gerontology tries to explain human ageing by employing basic insights and mechanisms from
reliability theory, which describes the human organism as a complex, redundant system (Gavrilov and
Gavrilova, 1991). The notion of ageing as accelerated loss of organ reserve is in line with the mainstream
view in the medical science. For example, initially, as a young adult, the functional capacity of human
organs is estimated to be tenfold higher than needed for survival (Fries, 1980).
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(about nutrition, usage of soft drugs, prevention of HIV infections etc.), and expenses for
treating health problems and curing illnesses which typically also hit younger adults, like
type 1 diabetes, virus infections, bacterial infections, orthopedic issues after accidents,
psychiatric problems. Examples of expenses aecting the distribution of health decits
of retirees conditional on the distribution of health decits of the working-aged are those
treating cardiovascular diseases, type 2 diabetes, cancer, stroke, lung disease, and arthrosis.
We measure health inequality of workers and retirees separately by the Gini coecient of
these distributions.
The main assumption that keeps the analysis tractable and the numerical results well
interpretable is that workers fully rely on the public (PAYG) pension system to nance
old-age consumption. A prime candidate for examining the optimal design of a social in-
surance system in such a context is Germany, where private insurance for health purposes
and private old age savings quantitatively play a minor role.4 Retired households received
about 80 percent of income from social security in the 1990s (Borsch-Supan and Schnabel,
1998). Empirical evidence also suggests that assuming agents who do not adjust private
savings when public pension policy changes well describes the behavior of the vast majority
of individuals (Chetty, 2015). For instance, in the year 2002, in Germany a subsidized
private annuity market scheme started operating that was similar to the subsidized IRA
accounts in the US. The public subsidies in this so-called \Riester -scheme" are especially
high as a percentage of contributions for low income households with children. They were
accompanied by heavy marketing campaigns of the federal government and insurance com-
panies. Moreover, there was a wide discussion of demographic changes and the implications
on the public pension system in the media. Indeed, about 11 million contracts have been
signed until the end of March 2008. Nevertheless, the impact of the subsidies on savings in
private annuity market was negligible (Corneo, Keese and Schroder, 2009; Borsch-Supan et
al., 2015). This suggests that the saving volumes dened in the contracts were low and/or
they replaced other forms of private annuity savings (that had already low volumes for the
4That said, the scope of our study certainly extends to other advanced countries. For instance, in the
US, social security is the most important source of support of retirees for the bottom half of the income
distribution (Poterba, 2014). Financial assets outside retirement accounts play a minor role for the vast
majority of households.
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bulk of households to begin with).
The analytical part rst establishes the links between health spending and pension
payments that works via the endogeneity of life expectancy. We further show that the
optimal allocation of health spending is typically tilted to the working-aged compared to
the one that would maximize life expectancy. The main reason is that maximizing life
expectancy may conict with the goal to receive high contributions to the pension system
of a productive workforce. The numerical part suggests that the status quo health system
in Germany is approximately optimal. The possibility to prolong life via future medical
progress shall be exploited by possibly drastically increasing the health contribution rate.
To limit the increase in the total tax burden individuals typically prefer to lower the pensions
savings rate at the same time, accompanied by a higher retirement age. Also interestingly,
more health spending as an optimal response to a more powerful medical technology, as a
rule, leads to more health inequality. The reason is that there are disproportionately large
gains in life expectancy for those who develop only a small number of health decits to
begin with. Our analysis also shows that, in most cases, individuals prefer to increase the
retirement age by a smaller factor than life expectancy expands.
After reviewing the related literature in section 2, we develop in section 3 a theoreti-
cal model based on evidence from gerontology. It highlights the fundamental interactions
between public pensions and health spending targeted to working-aged individuals and
retirees. In section 4, we analytically characterize the optimal allocation of health care
expenses for working-aged individuals and retirees by abstracting from the stochastic na-
ture of the ageing process for simplicity. Section 5 calibrates our stochastic framework to
Germany, which has a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system for both health care and pen-
sions. Section 6 conducts numerical analysis to derive the currently optimal joint design of
health and pension policy and studies the implications of the suggested policy reform on
health, life expectancy, and health inequality. Section 7 examines how the optimal policy
design should adjust when medical technology further improves and what it implies. The
last section concludes.
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2 Related Literature
In order to measure human functionality the medical science has proposed several indices
of human capability or disability. The theory and calibration approach in the present
paper is based on the so-called frailty index, which is particularly related to reliability
theory (Gavrilov and Gavrilova, 1991).5 The frailty index is computed for a large sample
of individuals and gives the fraction of the bodily impairments which are actually present
out of a long list of potential impairments, ranging from mild decits (reduced vision,
incontinence) to near lethal ones (e.g. stroke). The evidence suggests that the frailty index
of an individual correlates exponentially with age, that at any given age the number of
decits in a given population is approximately Poisson-distributed, and that the probability
of death strongly depends on the number of health decits that one has accumulated over
time (e.g. Mitnitski and Rockwood, 2002a, 2002b, 2005). Associating health status with
a simple count measure of health decits is thus both appealingly simple and empirically
successful. According to Rockwood and Mitnitski (2007) and Searle et al. (2008), the exact
choice of the set of potential decits is not crucial, provided that the set is suciently large.
Another important insight from gerontology for the present paper is that individual
decit accumulation is path-dependent. Transitions in health status can be very accurately
described by a Markov-chain augmented Poisson law according to which the probability
to get another health decit next period depends positively on the number of already
accumulated health decits (Mitnitski et al., 2006, 2007a, 2007b). This fact makes the
simultaneous investigation of health and pension policy interesting and challenging.
Notwithstanding the advances in the natural sciences to understand life cycle health,
the common conceptualization of health in economics is still based on the Grossman (1972)
model.6 The basic idea of the Grossman model is that individuals accumulate health
through investment in health capital, similar to the accumulation of human capital through
investment in education. Without further amendments this means that desired health
5Strulik and Vollmer (2013) used the reliability approach of Gavrilov and Gavrilova (1991) to empirically
investigate its implications for long-run trends of human ageing and longevity.
6The basic Grossman framework has been extended in various directions (e.g. Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990;
Hall and Jones, 2007).
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expenditure drops at the point of retirement and that health depreciation is greater when
the stock of health is large, that is when individuals are relatively young and healthy.
Preserving health would thus require health expenditure to be high at working age and low
at old age (for a critique, see Case and Deaton, 2005). In order to counteract this problem,
the literature has assumed that the health depreciation rate is increasing with age. In
contrast, modern gerontology suggests that individuals, as they age, do not accumulate
health capital but health decits.
Dalgaard and Strulik (2014) integrated into life cycle economics the notion of health
decit accumulation to understand the association between income and longevity. The
model has also been applied to examine the education gradient in health and life expectancy
(Strulik, 2013) and the long-run evolution of retirement behavior (Dalgaard and Strulik,
2012). So far, however, the theory was conned to life cycle decisions of a single agent.
In the present paper we integrate physiological ageing into a novel equilibrium framework
with two tiers of the social insurance system and endogenous longevity. We will rst
investigate the links between public health and pension policy for government budgets and
their welfare eects. We then draw from these insights in order to characterize the optimal
(i.e. welfare-maximizing) policy design.
There exists a relatively large literature discussing the impact of social security on labor
supply and retirement and on the optimality or sustainability of public pension systems (e.g.
Auerbach and Kotliko, 1987; Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines, 1995; Borsch-Supan,
2000; Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg, 2010, 2011; see Liebman and Feldstein, 2002, for a
survey). Particularly related to our paper is the study by Conesa and Krueger (1999) who
like us study welfare eects of social security reform for an economy in which heterogenous
individuals face a priori uncertainty about their ability (productivity). The interaction
of pension nance and health care, however, is not investigated. Sinn (1995) showed that
income redistribution is desirable by increasing risk-taking of expected utility maximizing
individuals behind the veil of ignorance, i.e. before idiosyncratic ability is revealed. Conesa,
Kitao and Krueger (2009) have used this concept in a macro model with idiosyncratic
ability of workers and a social security system. The focus of their study, however, was not
on optimal social security provision but on optimal income taxation.
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While most of the conventional public pension literature ignores issues of health and
longevity, there exists a smaller literature investigating the impact of health on labor supply
and retirement when health is exogenous (Philipson and Becker, 1998; French, 2005; Heijdra
and Romp, 2009; French and Jones, 2011; Imrohoroglu and Kital, 2012; Bloom, Canning
and Moore, 2014) and when it is endogenously determined via the Grossman model of
health capital accumulation (Wolfe, 1985; Galama et al., 2013). In Wolfe (1985), however,
retirement is not determined by welfare maximization, and in Galama et al. (2013) longevity
is not aected by health investment. Philipson and Becker (1998) investigate a life cycle
model with given retirement age, longevity enhancing health expenditure, and (public)
annuities. They argue that retired individuals demand too much health care because they
do not take into account the eect of their longevity increasing behavior on the annuity
level. They thus decide to live ineciently long rather than to live well. Heijdra and Romp
(2009) analyze the impact from pension reform in a general equilibrium setting, in the
presence of a realistic { but exogenously given { mortality process. Bloom, Canning and
Moore (2014) develop a life cycle model and use it to gauge the impact of changes in income
and life expectancy on age of retirement. Calibration to the US suggests that the optimal
retirement age decreases because of an income eect when wages grow despite increases in
longevity. Health and longevity, however, are exogenously given.
Pestieau, Ponthiere and Sato (2008) argue that private health spending should be taxed
when the replacement rate is suciently large. Leroux, Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011a,b)
extend the model towards heterogenous agents who dier in their (genetically determined)
probability of survival to retirement age. They show that optimal redistribution goes from
high-productivity to low-productivity agents and from short-lived to long-lived individuals.
While the available studies point to some interesting interaction of health and public
policy they abstract from important other channels. Most importantly the available litera-
ture focussed on the probability to reach an exogenously given retirement age and abstract
from the eect of health on longevity, i.e. the years spent in retirement. The available liter-
ature also did not take into account that idiosyncratic health endowments and health care
during the working age of the population aects productivity and income and therewith the
desired age of retirement. In particular, the path-dependency of health in working age and
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health in old age, emphasized in the gerontological literature, remained unexplored. In this
paper, we aim to overcome these shortcomings. We also attempt to ll an important gap in
the existing literature by addressing the questions how health spending should be allocated
over the life-cycle in interaction with the pension system and how health expenditure aects
health inequality.
3 The Model
Consider the following continuous-time model. At each date t, a new cohort of ex ante
identical individuals is born. The cohort size is time-invariant and normalized to unity.
This assumption reects our focus on the eects of ageing on the social insurance system
caused by higher life expectancy rather than by (presumably temporary) changes in the
birth rate. Ageing is stochastic in the sense that the deterioration process of health, and
thus life-time, is stochastic. Life consists of a working period and a retirement period.
3.1 The Social Insurance System
The statutory retirement age (i.e. the length of the working period) is denoted by R
and the same for all individuals, for simplicity. The government provides a health care
system and a pension system to maximize ex ante welfare behind the veil of ignorance.
Like in Germany, health expenditure and pension payments are nanced by proportional
social insurance contributions levied on labor income. There are separate budgets with
contribution rates h 2 (0; 1) and s 2 (0; 1), respectively. Both systems are pay-as-you-go
(PAYG), i.e. the revenues are paid out contemporaneously and the budgets are balanced.
We distinguish between health spending targeted to the working-aged population (e.g. for
prevention programmes and curative care for illnesses that typically also hit younger adults,
like virus infections and psychiatric problems) and health spending targeted to retirees (e.g.
for treating illnesses typically related to old age, like cardiovascular diseases, cancer and
arthrosis). The pension system is such that relative contributions between individuals of the
same cohort to the system during the working period correspond to relative payments during
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retirement in each point of time. Pension payments are time-invariant for an individual
during the retirement period. There are no frictions in the system and pension income is
not used to nance the social insurance system.
The government levies an additional, co-linear tax on labor income, wI T , where I is
labor income, w is the marginal tax rate and T is referred to as \transfer" (think about an
earned income tax credit). As will become apparent, individuals with lower health status
will supply less labor. Assuming a balanced budget, labor income taxation is therefore
redistributive.
We abstract from private forms of health expenditure and pension insurance. Speci-
cally, a private annuity market is missing and individuals cannot save privately for the re-
tirement period. This captures, albeit in a pronounced way, the little importance of private
savings for retirement wealth for the vast majority of households in Germany (Borsch-Supan
and Schnabel, 1998) for which we calibrate our model. The public pension system (`social
security') is an important source of retirees' income in the US as well (Poterba, 2014). Al-
lowing for private pension savings to complement social security would enhance analytical
complexity to the point of intractability in the case where life-time is uncertain. Assuming
non-optimizing households with respect to old-age consumption is consistent with evidence
from behavioral economics showing that most individuals stick to default pension plans
oered by their employers (e.g. Chetty, 2015).7 Such evidence widely opens the scope for
public policy, as discussed by Beshears et al. (2009), who survey the literature. Inter alia
they point to evidence by Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) who show that the rate of return
of the default portfolio in the Swedish social security system was higher than the perfor-
mance of individuals who opted out of the default and selected the portfolio of assets by
themselves.
7In an interesting recent paper, Caliendo and Findley (2013) derive the optimal social security provi-
sion in the US by analyzing a calibrated model in which individuals save an exogenous fraction of their
disposable income. Under such non-optimizing behavior, the current size of the US social security program
is supported.
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3.2 Production
At each date, there is a single homogenous consumption good which is produced according
to a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Output Y is given by
Y = F (K;AL)  ALf(k); k  K
AL
; (1)
where K and L are the inputs of physical capital and labor, the latter being measured
in eciency units. A is an exogenous measure of productivity. f() is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and fullls the Inada conditions.
Output is sold in a perfectly competitive environment. The output price is normalized
to unity. The rate of return to capital, r, is internationally given (i.e. we consider a
small open economy assuming capital income is not taxed) and time-invariant. Thus,
prot maximization of the representative rm implies that k is given by r = f 0(k), i.e.
k = (f 0) 1(r)  k(r). Consequently, the wage rate per eciency unit of human capital
reads as w = A! with !  f(k(r))  k(r)f 0(k(r)).
3.3 Individuals
Individuals are indexed by i. The number of health decits during the working period and
the retirement period is denoted by n1(i) and n2(i), respectively. An individual reaches the
retirement age if he/she has suciently few health decits in the working period. Let ~T (n),
n 2 S = f0; 1; :::; ng, be a strictly decreasing function with the following interpretation.
Individual i reaches the retirement age if ~T (n1(i))  R and dies before age R otherwise;
in the latter case, life-time is given by ~T (n1(i)). If i reaches retirement age, life-time is
max( R; ~T (n2(i))). Let S  fn 2 S : n > ~T 1( R)g denote the set of health decit numbers
in working age such that an individual does not reach the retirement age and S  fn 2 S :
n  ~T 1( R)g the set of health decits that it does; S = S [ S. In sum, individual life-time,
T (i), negatively depends on the number of individual health decits (Mitnitski et al., 2005,
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2007) and is given by8
T (i) =
8>>><>>>:
~T (n1(i)) if n1(i) 2 S;
R if n1(i) 2 S and n2(i) 2 S;
~T (n2(i)) otherwise.
(2)
Life-time is nite even without any health decits during retirement. The healthiest retiree
dies at age Tmax  ~T (0) < 1. The individual length of the working period, R(i), is given
by
R(i) = ~R(n1(i); R) 
8<: ~T (n1(i)) if n1(i) 2 S;R if n1(i) 2 S. (3)
Individuals derive utility from material consumption and disutility from labor supply in
the working period and the length of the working period. Life-time utility of an individual
i reads as
U(i) =
T (i)Z
0
e t

c(i; t)1    1
1     (n1(i))
l(i; t)1+1=
1 + 1=

dt  V (R(i); n1(i)); (4)
where t indexes calendar time, c(i; t) and l(i; t) are consumption and labor supply of in-
dividual i at time t, respectively,  2 (0; 1] is the discount rate,  > 0 is the degree of
relative risk aversion, and  > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (at the intensive
margin). Function (n) is non-decreasing and captures that a better health status may
reduce the disutility of labor. V represents the disutility from working along the extensive
margin, also possibly dependent on health decits at working age. V (R; n1) is increasing
and convex as a function of the length of the working period, R, and non-decreasing and
convex in the number of health decits during the working period, n1. Also suppose that
V has weakly increasing dierences, i.e., if anything, a marginal increase in the length of
the working period has a larger impact on the disutility of work when the worker is less
8The two-period set up in continuous time may imply that a non-zero mass of individuals dies exactly
at statutory retirement age R. According to (2), an individual surviving to retirement age may experience
a health shock and immediately die after reaching the statutory retirement age. In the numerical analysis,
reasonably, the mass of individuals dying exactly at age R will be negligible.
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healthy; formally, we assume that V (R; n01)   V (R; n1) is non-decreasing in R whenever
n01 > n1.
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According to (2)-(4), health decits during retirement aect utility only via reducing
life expectancy. We deliberately focus on this case to obtain a conservative value for the
welfare-maximizing level of health spending. If we nd that the status quo health spending
is not too high even in the case where health status has no non-material eect on utility
for the elderly, as assumed also in Becker (2007), then there is a strong argument not to
decrease health spending now and possibly to increase it drastically if medical technology
improves.
We focus our analysis on a steady state equilibrium where the composition of cohorts
is the same at each point in time. Each individual possesses the same amount of nancial
assets during working age, a.10 Thus, including the government transfer, T , they have non-
labor income y = ra+T ~y(T ). We impose the standard assumption that the interest rate
equals the discount rate, r = . Since individuals rely on the pension system for old age
consumption, consequently, they are perfectly smoothing consumption during the working
period, i.e., for all t 2 [0; R(i)],
c(i; t) = (1  w   h   s)wl(i; t) + y  ~w()l(i; t) + ~y(T ); (5)
where ~w()  (1  w   h   s)w denotes the net wage rate and  (h; s; w). The rst-
order condition on labor supply implies that at each instant the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor supply equals the net wage rate. Hence, using (5), labor
supply of individual i is implicitly given by the condition
(n1(i))l(i; t)
1=
[ ~w()l(i; t) + ~y(T )]  = ~w(): (6)
For all t 2 [0; R(i)], individual labor supply can thus be expressed as a function of health
9Under dierentiability, the assumption of weakly increasing dierences of disutility function V means
that VnR  0, where subscripts on V denote partial derivatives.
10We implictly assume that nancial wealth is passed on from parents to children when entering re-
tirement. Working aged individuals reach the retirement age with high probability and the size of the
working aged population remains approximately constant also when considering health policy changes in
our analysis.
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decits at working age, n1, the net wage rate ~w, and non-labor income ~y:
l(i; t) = ~l(n1(i); ~w(); ~y(T )): (7)
Labor supply is lower for individuals with more health decits if and only if 0 > 0. The
case where @~l(n1; )=@n1 < 0 is consistent with evidence provided by Cai, Mavromaras and
Oguzoglu (2014), showing that individuals who experience moderate health shocks respond
by incremental reductions in labor supply. Labor supply is increasing in non-labor income,
@~l(n1; ~w; ~y)=@~y > 0. We will calibrate the model such that @~l(n1; ~w; ~y)=@ ~w > 0, i.e. labor
supply is strictly decreasing in contribution rates h and s.
According to (5) and (7), consumption of individual i during the working period reads,
for all t 2 [0; R(i)], as
c(i; t) = ~w()~l(n1(i); ~w(); ~y(T )) + ~y(T )  ~C1(n1(i); ; T ): (8)
3.4 Evolution of Health Decits
Health spending is measured in terms of the numeraire good. Health spending levels tar-
geted to the working-aged and retirees per capita of the respective group are denoted by h1
and h2, respectively. In line with empirical evidence, the number of health decits in the
population both at working age and retirement age is Poisson-distributed in both periods
of life. Let
g(nj; j) = e
 j (j)
nj
nj!
(9)
denote the probability density function (p.d.f.) of health decits in period j 2 f1; 2g of life.
The Poisson parameters 1 and 2 (the average number and variance of health decits in
period 1 and 2, respectively) depend on productivity-adjusted per capita health spending
levels h1  h1=A and h2  h2=A in period 1 and 2, respectively. That is, to maintain the
amount of health services after an increase in total factor productivity, A, health spending
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has to increase proportionally with A.11 We assume that
1 = ~a1(h1); (10)
2 = ~a2(h2) + bn1; (11)
where ~a1 and ~a2 are functions with properties ~a
0
j < 0 and ~a
00
j > 0, j 2 f1; 2g. The convexity
assumptions capture the notion that the negative eect of higher health expenditure on
health decits is strictly decreasing. b > 0 is a parameter that is independent of health
spending. It captures that the number of health decits in retirement age, n2, is path-
dependent in a stochastic sense. That is, the distribution of n2 is conditional on n1. The
path-dependency of health decits is consistent with overwhelming evidence from gerontol-
ogy which suggests that the probability to get another health decit next period depends
positively on the number of already accumulated health decits, according to a Markov-
chain augmented Poisson law (Mitnitski et al., 2006, 2007a, 2007b).
Using (10) and (11) in (9), the joint p.d.f. of (n1; n2) is given by
G(n1; n2; h1; h2)  g(n1; ~a1(h1))g(n2; ~a2(h2) + bn1): (12)
According to (2) and (9)-(12), life expectancy at birth (LE) is increasing in health spending
and reads as
LE =
X
n12 S
g(n1; ~a1(h1)) ~T (n1) + R
X
n12S
X
n22 S
G(n1; n2; h1; h2)+
X
n12S
X
n22S
G(n1; n2; h1; h2) ~T (n2): (13)
11For instance, suppose productivity advances in the nal goods sector do not improve average health
status since the health sector employs labor as input and wage costs rise proportionally (recall that the
wage rate w is proportional to A). For simplicity, we implicitly assume that health workers are cross-border
commuters.
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4 Welfare Analysis
We start the welfare analysis by deriving the government budget constraints that reect
the macroeconomic trade-os faced by the social planner. We then state the optimization
problem and look at a simple case analytically, before entering the numerical analysis in
sections 5-7.
4.1 Government Budget Constraints
Denote by N1 and N2 the size of the population in working age and the number of retirees,
respectively. Summing the survivors in working age over all cohorts, the number of workers
reads as
N1 =
X
n12S
g(n1; ~a1(h1)) ~R(n1; R)  ~N1(h1; R): (14)
It is easy to see that ~N1 is non-decreasing in h1 and increasing R. If all individuals reach
the retirement age ( S = ?), then N1 = R. Using (12), the number of retirees, N2, can be
written as
N2 =
X
n12S
X
n22S
G(n1; n2; h1; h2)

~T (n2)  R

 ~N2(h1; h2; R): (15)
Because lowering the number of health decits raises life-time and because health decits
are path-dependent, ~N2 is increasing in both h1 and h2. ~N2 is decreasing in R.
4.1.1 Health Expenditure Constraint
Using (8), the government budget constraint for health spending (nanced by labor income
contributions at rate h) is given by N1h1 +N2h2 = hwL, where total labor input is
L =
X
n12S
g(n1; ~a1(h1)) ~R(n1; R)~l(n1; ~w(); ~y(T ))  ~L(h1; ; R; T ): (16)
Using (14), (15), h1 = h1=A, h2 = h2=A and w = A! we obtain
~N1(h1; R)h1 + ~N2(h1; h2; R)h2 = h! ~L(h1; ; R; T ): (17)
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According to (17), there is a non-trivial relationship between health spending for the
working-aged and for retirees. First, for a given tax revenue, there is a trade-o between
the two since both kinds of spending are nanced by the same source. Second, if h1 rises,
the distribution of health decits in the working-aged population improves. If anything,
this has positive eects on total labor supply (@ ~L=@h1 > 0) such that the health budget
available per retiree is enlarged. If S 6= ? (i.e. not all individuals reach the retirement age)
and h1 increases, more individuals survive to the retirement period. Moreover, if health
status correlates with labor supply (0 > 0), workers supply more labor at each instant.
Third, however, an increase in h1 means that the population size of retirees, N2, increases
via the path dependency of health decits (if S 6= ?, also N1 increases) leaving less health
spending per retiree.
In the case where the (net) wage elasticity of labor supply is positive, individuals reduce
labor supply in response to a higher pension savings rate, s. Thus, @ ~L=@s < 0 and revenue
in the health system decreases. Finally, a reasonable policy mix would avoid Laer eects,
such that the health budget shall be enlarged by an increase in the health contribution rate
h.
4.1.2 Pension Payment Constraint
We next discuss the pension system. Consider rst the properties of the \dependency-
ratio", dened as the number of beneciaries per worker,
D =
N2
N1
=
~N2(h1; h2; R)
~N1(h1; R)
 ~D(h1; h2; R): (18)
Lemma 1. The dependency ratio function, ~D, is increasing in health spending tar-
geted to the elderly, h2, and decreasing in the statutory retirement age, R. The impact of
an increase in h1 on ~D is generally ambiguous; it is positive if all individuals reach the
retirement age ( S = ?).
Proof. Follows from (18) in view of the properties @ ~N1=@h1  0 (with equality if
S = ?), @ ~N1=@ R > 0, @ ~N2=@ R < 0, @ ~N2=@h1 > 0, and @ ~N2=@h2 > 0.
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Lemma 1 suggests that higher health spending for the elderly has a dismal eect on
pension nance, by raising life expectancy and thus also the dependency ratio. The same
may hold when increasing health spending for the working-aged; the eect is generally
ambiguous because an increase in h1 may help more people to survive until R.
Recall that the government perfectly smoothes consumption during the retirement pe-
riod by paying out an individual-specic and time-invariant pension income, denoted by
C2(i) for individual i. The ratio of pension payments of two individuals who reach the
retirement period is equal to the ratio of their labor income. Thus, for two individuals i
and i0,
C2(i)
C2(i0)
=
~l(n1(i); ~w; ~y)
~l(n1(i0); ~w; ~y)
. (19)
Denote by Cmax2 the pension payment for a retiree who had no health decits during the
working period and thus supplied ~l(0; ~w; ~y) units of labor. According to (19), for any i we
have
C2(i) = ~l(n1(i); ~w; ~y)
Cmax2
~l(0; ~w; ~y)
: (20)
In a PAYG pension system, the total revenue from the pension contributions, swL, must
equal the aggregate expenses. Thus, using (20),
swL =
X
n012S
X
n022S
G(n01; n
0
2; h1; h2)
h
~T (n02)  R
i
~l(n01; ~w; ~y)
Cmax2
~l(0; ~w; ~y)
: (21)
Solving (21) for Cmax2 =
~l(0; ), inserting into (20) and using 1 = ~a1(h1) as well as (16) implies
that consumption of beneciary i for all t 2 [ R; T (i)] is given by
C2(i) = ~l(n1(i))
sw
P
n012S1 g(n
0
1; ~a1(h1)) ~R(n
0
1; R)
~l(n01; ~w(); ~y(T ))P
n012S
P
n022S G(n
0
1; n
0
2; h1; h2)
h
~T (n02)  R
i
~l(n01; ~w(); ~y(T ))
 ~C2(n1(i); h1; h2; ; R; T ), n1(i) 2 S. (22)
Proposition 1. The PAYG pension payment function ~C2 is increasing in the statutory
retirement age, R. If and only if the wage elasticity of labor supply is zero, ~C2 is independent
of the health contribution rate, h. ~C2 is decreasing in health spending targeted to retirees,
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h2. The eect of an increase in health spending targeted to the working-aged, h1, on ~C2 is
generally ambiguous; it is negative if 0 = 0 and S = ?.
Proof. Follows from (22) in view of ~a01 < 0, ~a
0
2 < 0, and (3).
An increase in the statutory retirement age, R, raises pension payments by decreasing
the dependency ratio, all other things being equal. That pension payments are aected by
the health contribution rate, h, if labor supply is elastic, reects the interaction between
the two pillars of the social insurance system through the distortionary eect of taxation.
The interaction between health spending and pension nance is also seen when we change
old-age health care spending, h2. An increase in h2 raises life expectancy and thus lowers
pension payments per retiree. By contrast, an increase in health care spending for workers,
h1, may as well boost pension payments. It raises labor supply if 
0 > 0 and helps that
fewer individuals die before they reach retirement age (if S 6= ?). Both eects increase
the contributions to the pension system. However, these positive eects do not necessarily
dominate the eect originating from the path-dependency of health decits: as the average
number of health decits prior to retirement is reduced by raising h1, life expectancy at
retirement age increases, in turn raising the dependency ratio.
4.1.3 Transfer Income
Transfer expenditure for working-aged individuals must equal the revenue from taxing labor
income at rate w, i.e., N1T = wwL. Using (14) and (16), the transfer T  ~T (h1; ; R) is
implicitly given by
~N1(h1; R)T = ww~L(h1; ; R; T ): (23)
4.2 Welfare Optimization Problem
Using (7), (8) and (22) in (4), utility of individual i can be written as
U(i) =
8>>><>>>:
U^(n1(i); h1; ; R) if n1(i) 2 S
U(n1(i); h1; ; R) if n1(i) 2 S and n2(i) 2 S
~U(n1(i); n2(i); h1; h2; ; R) otherwise,
(24)
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where
U^(n1; h1; ; R)   V ( ~T (n1); n1) + 1  e
  ~T (n1)

 
~C1(n1; ~w(); ~T (h1; ; R))1    1
1     (n1)
~l(n1; ~w(); ~y( ~T (h1; ; R)))1+1=
1 + 1=
!
;
(25)
U(n1; h1; ; R)   V ( R; n1) + 1  e
  R

 
~C1(n1; ~w(); ~T (h1; ; R))1    1
1     (n1)
~l(n1; ~w(); ~y( ~T (h1; ; R)))1+1=
1 + 1=
!
;
(26)
~U(n1; n2; h1; h2; ; R)   V ( R; n1) + 1  e
  R

 
~C1(n1; ~w(); ~T (h1; ; R))1    1
1     (n1)
~l(n1; ~w(); ~y( ~T (h1; ; R)))1+1=
1 + 1=
!
+
e  R   e  ~T (n2)

 
~C2(n1; h1; h2; ; R; ~T (h1; ; R))1    1
1  
!
: (27)
Expected welfare behind the veil of ignorance then reads as
W (h1; h2; ; R) 
X
n12 S
g(n1; ~a1(h1))U^(n1; h1; ; R) +
X
n12S
X
n22 S
G(n1; n2; h1; h2) U(n1; h1; ; R)+
X
n12S
X
n22S
G(n1; n2; h1; h2) ~U(n1; n2; h1; h2; ; R): (28)
The optimal policy mix solves
max
h1;h2;h;s; R
W (h1; h2; ; R) s.t. (17), (29)
where labor supply functions ~l(n1; ), n1 2 S, are implicitly dened by (6).
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4.3 The Deterministic Case
We next highlight the interaction between health expenditure levels in both periods of life
for welfare, as implied by the relationship between h1 and h2 in the government budget
constraints. For this goal, we simplify by abstracting from the stochastic nature of the
ageing process, i.e. all individuals are identical also ex post and reach the retirement age.
Since all individuals are identical, it is meaningless to assume redistribution among workers.
Thus, w = T = 0 and non-labor income y of workers is exogenous.
Dene the net wage function for w = 0 as w^(h; s)  ~w(h; s; 0). As R(i) = R for all i
and cohort size is normalized to unity, the mass of working-aged individuals and retirees is
N1 = R; N2 = ~T (n2)  R; (30)
respectively. In view of (10) and (11), with a degenerated density function g, the number
of health decits of each individual in period 1 and 2 of life equals
n1 = a1 = ~a1(h1); (31)
n2 = a2 + bn1 = ~a2(h2) + b~a1(h1): (32)
The relationship between health spending for the working-aged and for retirees reads as
N1h1 +N2h2 = h R!~l(n1; ). Using (30), (31) and (32), we have
h1 +
 
~T (~a2(h2) + b~a1(h1))
R
  1
!
h2 = h!~l(~a1(h1); w^(h; s); y); (33)
implicitly dening h2  ~h2(h1; h; s; R) as a function of the other policy instruments. Using
this in (32) leads to
n2 = ~a2(~h2(h1; h; s; R)) + b~a1(h1)  ~n2(h1; h; s; R): (34)
According to (8) and (31), at each instant, consumption of working-aged individuals is
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given by
C1 = w^(h; s)~l(~a1(h1); w^(h; s); y) + y: (35)
Equating aggregate expenses to aggregate contributions in the pension system, N2C2 =
N1sw~l(n1; w^(h; s); y), and using (30), (31) and (34), we nd that the pension payment
per retiree at each instant reads as
C2 =
Rsw~l(~a1(h1); w^(h; s); y)
~T (~n2(h1; h; s; R))  R
: (36)
Using (31), (35), (36) and T = ~T (n2) in (4), individual welfare reads as
U =  V ( R; ~a1(h1)) + 1  e
  R

0B@
h
w^(h; s)~l(~a1(h1); w^(h; s); y) + y
i1 
  1
1     (~a1(h1))
~l(~a1(h1); w^(); y)
1+1=
1 + 1=
1CA+
e  R   e  ~T (n2)

0B@
h
Rsw~l(~a1(h1);w^(h;s);y)
~T (n2)  R
i1 
  1
1  
1CA  u(h1; h; s; R; n2): (37)
A social planer sets policy parameters to solve
max
h10;h2[0;1];s2[0;1]; R2[0;Tmax];n22S
u(h1; h; s; R; n2) s.t. n2 = ~n2(h1; h; s; R): (38)
Denote by (h1; 

h ; 

s ;
R) the solution to (38) with respect to the policy variables. The op-
timal health spending targeted to the retirees is inferred as h2  ~h2(h1;  h ;  s ; R). To avoid
only mildly interesting discussions about potential corner solutions, we focus our analysis
on interior solutions of (38). First, we deal with the question whether the optimal alloca-
tion of health spending towards working-aged and retired individuals, (h1; h

2), maximizes
life-time.12
Proposition 2. Suppose that (h1; 

h ; 

s ; R
) is an interior maximizer of (38). Then
12For analytical simplicity, we treat health decits n1 and n2 as (non-negative) real numbers rather than
as integers for the proof of Proposition 2.
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the optimal allocation of health spending across periods of life maximizes life expectancy if
and only if 0 = 0 and V does not depend on n1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If an increase in health spending targeted to the working-aged has no eect on labor
supply (0 = 0) and individuals do not care about health status per se (i.e. V does
not depend on n1), then the social planer wants to maximize the span of life in which
individuals earn retirement income. This is achieved by minimizing health decits of the
elderly, n2 = ~n2(h1; h; s; R). If 
0 > 0, however, an increase in labor supply that results
from an increase in health expenditure, h1, raises contributions to the pension system.
Hence, it is optimal to sacrice life-time to improve consumption in each point of time
for both working-aged individuals and retirees. Also if workers have direct disutility from
illness (V is increasing in n1), the social planer biases the health spending structure towards
workers. Proposition 2 would also hold under a \constrained optimal policy mix" where
pension policy (s; R) is treated as given.
The optimal mix of health and pension policy is hard to characterize analytically because
of the various interactions between the health and pension system. For instance, consider
the welfare interaction of the pension contribution rate, s, with the health contribution
rate, h. On the one hand, raising h may make an increase in s less worthwhile and vice
versa because contributions to the health system and the pension system come from the
same source (labor earnings) and the marginal utility of consumption is declining. On the
other hand, an increase in h implies that individuals live longer, all other things equal, thus
prolonging the retirement period. This raises the benet to contribute more to the pension
system, i.e. to increase s together with h. If h is increased such that life-time expands, it
may seem a good idea to raise retirement age, R, as well. This is often suggested in debates
on demographic change. However, if R increases, the number of contributors to both tiers
of the social insurance system, N1, rises. It is thus not clear if contribution rates to either
form of social insurance should be positively or negatively associated with the retirement
age.
We next investigate a numerically calibrated version of the model in order to disam-
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biguate the analytical considerations and to assess optimal health and pension policies and
the implications on health inequality and welfare quantitatively.
5 Calibration for Germany
We calibrate our model for Germany, which has a public PAYG pension system and a public
PAYG health system with a common health budget for workers and retirees.13
We assume that the technology (1) for producing nal output has the Cobb-Douglas
form Y = K%(AL)1 %, % 2 (0; 1). For an exogenous interest rate, r, the wage rate is given
by w = A(1   %)(%=r)%=(1 %). For later reference, GDP is inferred as Y = wL=(1   %).
Capital income is calibrated at ra = %Y . We set the typical value % = 1=3 for the output
elasticity of capital.
We interpret a unit of calendar time in the model as 45 years. Assuming that people
start on average working at age 20, the working period lasts 45 years, which is regarded as
the normal earnings history in the German system (Eck-Rentner). In terms of our model,
the current statutory retirement age in Germany is thus captured by R = 1. We set the
annual real interest rate and discount rate to r =  = 0:02. Consistent with the construction
of the frailty index in the literature, we set the maximum number of human health decits
to a typical value, n = 20. Our results are independent from the metric of health decits
as long as n is high enough.14 According to (2), life span is a function of the accumulated
health decits. We specify ~T (n) = Tmax  exp(   n),  > 0, and set the maximum life
span to Tmax = 1:78, which corresponds to 20 + 1:78  45 = 100 years.
Formally, employees and employers both contribute to the social insurance system in
Germany. Economically relevant is the tax incidence, however. Consistent with our small
open economy assumption (i.e. perfectly elastic labor demand), we assume that all pension
and health contributions are born by employees. The current pension savings rate, s, is
13Our approach could also be used in the US context, which explicitly has a health budget for retirees
(medicaid expenditure), by assuming that revenue is collected from taxing labor income.
14Our results are virtually identical when alternatively setting n = 30 or n = 40 (not shown). Inter-
estingly, important statistical relations based on the frailty index are also independent of the number of
potential bodily impairments as long as n is high enough; see Rockwood and Mitnitski (2007) and Searle
et al. (2008).
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18.7 percent according to the share of gross wages deducted for social security (Gesetzliche
Rentenversicherung). The model assumes that there are no private savings for old age. In
the case of Germany this seems to be an acceptable approximation since retired households
receive about 80 percent of income from social security (see Borsch-Supan and Schnabel,
1998). The health contribution rate, h, is set to 15.5 percent, which is the fraction of gross
labor income paid for the German public health care insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenver-
sicherung). According to the OECD (2015, Tab. 3.8), the marginal labor income tax rate
in Germany for married couples with two children in the year 2014, evaluated at average
income, was 26-28 percent (depending on the number of children and whether it is a one-
earner or two-earner family). Without children, it was 19 percent in a two-earner family
and 21 percent for single earners. We set w = 0:25.
In our social insurance context, we expect results to respond sensitively to the curvature
of the utility function with respect to consumption, parameterized by . To calibrate ,
we follow Chetty (2006) and consider an individual for which ex post labor income and
non-labor income are proportional. Using (6), it is easy to show that the uncompensated
wage elasticity of labor supply is then constant and reads as
@~l(n1; ~w; y)
@ ~w

y=& ~w~l(n1; ~w;y)
 ~w
~l(n1; ~w; y)
=
1 + &   
1+&

+ 
 "; (39)
& > 0. It depends on the Frisch wage elasticity, , the factor of proportionality, &, and the
coecient of relative risk aversion, . Expression (39) also shows that " is positive if and
only if  is suciently small, which puts an upper bound on  (Chetty, 2006); that is, " > 0
if and only if  < 1 + &. Naturally, the labor supply elasticity varies with the concept of
the household. According to Bargain, Orsini and Peichl (2014), the uncompensated labor
supply elasticity in Germany in the year 2001 when not distinguishing between intensive
and extensive margin is estimated to be 0.14 for men in couples and 0.31 for women in
couples. For singles, it is 0.2 for men and 0.18 for women. Looking alone at the intensive
margin, estimates are much lower and are basically zero for men. In the benchmark run
we set " to 0.14, the estimated labor supply elasticity for men in couples. Moreover, we
assume log-utility for consumption, i.e.  = 1, consistent with evidence by Chetty (2006),
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Engelhardt and Kumar (2009) and Hartley, Lanot and Walker (2013). We also follow
Chetty (2006) and assume & = 0:5, which captures an average labor income share of two
thirds. According to (39), " = 0:14,  = 1 and & = 0:5 imply a reasonable value  = 0:58
for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We provide sensitivity analysis for labor supply
elasticities and the curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption.
We allow for health decits during working age to aect labor supply by specifying
(n1) = 0e
n1 , 0 > 0,   0. According to (6), we then have
  @
~l(n1; ~w; y)=@n1
~l(n1; ~w; y)

y=& ~w~l(n1; ~w;y)
=
(1 + &)
1+&

+ 
 : (40)
This suggests that we can approximate ~l(n1; )=~l(0; )  exp( n1). Although empirical
evidence shows that individuals with poorer health status retire earlier (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2014), Cai et al. (2014) strongly argue that individuals (presumably those who
are not close to retirement age) typically respond to health shocks by gradually reducing
labor supply rather than opting out fully. They present evidence on the eect of health
shocks and health status at the intensive and the extensive margin. Quantitatively, the bulk
of the response to health shocks is at the intensive margin, in line with our model (which
ignores the extensive margin for simplicity, unless workers die before reaching the statutory
retirement age). According to their Table 1, both men and women with \fair" health
(the fourth out of ve categories for health status) supply, on average, about 25 percent
less working hours than those with \excellent" health (the highest category). Associating
\excellent" health with zero health decits and \fair" health with three health decits
suggests   0:1.15 With & = 0:5,  = 1,  = 0:58 and  = 0:1, (40) implies  = 0:25.
Mitnitski et al. (2007) have shown that the intergenerational distribution of decits can
be precisely described by a Poisson process, as captured by (9). The Poisson parameters
1 and 2 which determine the arrival of new decits in the two periods of life, are given
15For  = 0:1, ~l(3; )=~l(0; ) = exp( 0:3)  0:74. For being consistent with the working hours of those
with "poor" health, which are about 75% lower than of those with "excellent" health, when  = 0:1,
~l(n1; )=~l(0; )  0:25 is reached for n1 = 14.
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by (10) and (11), respectively. We specify
~aj(hj) = j  exp( j  hj); j > 0; j  0; (41)
j 2 f1; 2g, to capture in a parsimonious way that the arrival rates for new decits depend
on the general health environment (j), and a health technology with decreasing returns
of health expenditure (interaction between j and hj). We calibrate the parameters in (41)
such that the model approximates actual survival probabilities for each age group. For that
purpose we assume that health care expenditure before the 20th century was ineective
in prolonging life of adults (20 years and older), i.e. 1 = 2 = 0 for the year 1900 (and
earlier). This assumption is approximately true. Before the 20th century life expectancy
rose predominantly because of fewer deaths in infancy and childhood. Improving adult life
expectancy is a phenomenon of the 20th century. According to Milligan and Wise (2011),
mortality at age 65 did not decline substantially until the 1970s. We use the fact that
for ages above 20 the force of mortality, that is the conditional probability (x) to die at
age x, is precisely measured by Gompertz law, (x) = B exp(x). Using the data from
the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) Strulik and Vollmer (2013) estimate
 = 0:11, B = 0:00001 for the year 2000 and  = 0:0092, B = 0:00078 for the year 1950.
Unfortunately we do not have mortality data for Germany earlier than 1950. From Strulik
and Vollmer (2013) we know that the average Western European values were  = 0:08,
B = 0:00018 in 1900. For England and Sweden historical data exists for a longer period.
The average European values in the year 1900 are approximately also observed for England
in 1850-1900 and for Sweden in 1750-1900 (see Strulik and Vollmer, 2013). The time
invariance of these numbers is consistent with the general observation that adult mortality
was very similar in Western Europe and did not change much before the 20th century. We
thus set  = 0:08 and B = 0:00018 for 1900 and earlier and  = 0:11 and B = 0:00001 for
the year 2000. From these values we compute the unconditional survival probability S(x)
by solving _S(x)=S(x) = (x) for S(x). The result is shown in Figure 1. The solid blue line
shows survival rates in 1900, the red dashed line shows survival rates in 2000.
We begin with estimating , 1, 2, and b such that the predicted age-dependent sur-
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Figure 1: Actual and Predicted Survival Probability
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Survival probabilities in Germany according to Gompertz law in 1900 (solid
line) and 2000 (dashed line) and predictions by the model (dots). Squares
indicate improvement of survival not originating from improved health care.
See text for details.
vival probabilities provide the best t of the actual survival probabilities in the year 1900
(given 1 = 2 = 0). The blue circles in Figure 1 show the implied survival probabilities for
 = 0:062, 1 = 1:9, 2 = 3:8 and b = 2:5. How much of the upward shift of the survival
curve during the 20th century has been caused by improved health care is a debated issue,
which is not yet completely resolved. Much of the improved survival at working age was
likely to be driven by improved nutrition and public health measures like sanitation and
the implied reduction in the spread of diseases (McKeown, 1976; Fogel; 1994). Old age
diseases like cardiovascular diseases and cancer, however, were largely unaected by these
trends and they were actually increasing during the rst half of the 20th century. Moreover,
the reductions in mortality at old age achieved since the 1950s can be largely attributed to
medical innovations and improved medical care (Cutler and Meara, 2001). We take these
stylized facts into account and assume for the benchmark run of the model that about 50
percent of improved survival of the working aged is caused by an \improved health environ-
ment", as shown by the green squares in Figure 1. It is reached by an exogenous reduction
of 1 from 1.9 to 1.5, while leaving 2 unchanged. Notice that survival in retirement im-
proves as well (albeit by less than 50 percent) because of the intergenerational transmission
of better health as driven by path-dependency parameter b.
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We assume that the remainder of the shift of the survival curve has been caused by
health technology and health expenditure. To jointly calibrate technology parameters 1,
2, and per capita health expenditure levels, we assume that h1 and h2 fulll health budget
constraint (17) and h1=h2 = 0:29 is current ratio of health care expenditure per working-
aged individual to that per retiree in Germany.16 Under these assumptions, the best t
of the survival curve for the year 2000 is reached for 1 = 0:83 and 2 = 0:60. Predicted
survival is shown by red circles in Figure 1. The calibrated model predicts that actual life
expectancy at birth, LE as given by (13), is 78.5 years. Actually, life expectancy at birth
was 78.0 years in the year 2000 (and 80.0 years in 2010, according to World Bank, 2015).
Moreover, it predicts a GDP share of health care expenditure of 10.3 percent while actually
it was 10.7 percent in the year 2008.
For further comparison with the actual data we computed the implied distribution of
the frailty index, i.e. of the relative number of health decits out of a long list of potential
bodily impairments, conditional on age. Harttgen et al. (2013) have calculated the frailty
index from the `Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe' (SHARE) data for
several European countries including Germany. Estimates and predictions are shown in
Figure 2. As a reading example for the left panel of Figure 2, since the maximum number
of health decits in the calibrated model is n = 20, a frailty index of 0.2 means four health
decits. The model approximates the overall distribution reasonably well. The working-
aged individuals in our model are a bit too healthy when compared with 50-54 year old
persons from the SHARE sample. This seems ne, however, since that cohort is already
quite close to the retirement age compared to the average German worker. Unfortunately,
SHARE does not provide any data for persons younger than 50. The frailty distribution of
the retired population in our calibrated model corresponds very well to the actual frailty
distribution of the 75-79 year olds.
Disutility of work at the extensive margin (retirement) is driven by a preference for
16We use data from the Statistical Oce in Germany on health costs and population sizes split up by
age, retrieved on September 20, 2015 (https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online). Total health costs
for those aged 15-64 and those aged 65+ are about EUR 116 million and 123 million, respectively. The
population size of those aged 65+ relative to those aged 15-64 is about 0.31. This implies that health
spending for someone aged 15-64 is less than a third than health spending for someone aged 65+.
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Figure 2: The Frailty Index: Calibration vs. Estimation from SHARE Data for Germany
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Left: predicted probability distribution of the frailty index for working age population (solid
line) and retired population (dashed line). Right: Estimated density of the frailty index for
the age group 50-54 and 75 to 79.
leisure. We specify
V (R; n1) =   (1 +   n1) R1+1=;  > 0;  > 0;   0: (42)
We set  = 0:25, which equals the Frisch elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin,
according to recent evidence (Chetty et al., 2011a,b). It turns out that the model provides
considerable variation in results with respect to alternative assumptions about , i.e. the
inuence of health on the disutility from work. We set  = 1 in the benchmark run
and provide sensitivity analysis for smaller and larger . A value of  of one means that
individuals are willing to retire three years later for an improvement of their frailty index
at retirement age from 0.1 (approximately the mode of the distribution of the frailty index
in Germany at age 65) to 0.05 (i.e. a reduction in health decits from n1 = 2 to n1 = 1 out
of n = 20 potential decits).17
This leaves us with two degrees of freedom, the value of  in disutility function V and
the scale parameter A in the production technology. We pin down these parameters by
17To see this, evaluate the marginal rate of substitution between R and n given utility V , i.e. Vn=VR =
R(1 + n1)
 1=(1 + 1=), at  = R = 1, n1 = 2, and  = 0:25 (subscripts on V denote partial derivatives).
This gives us Vn=VR = 1=15. Recalling that a time period of one corresponds to 45 years in our model, the
increase in retirement age which makes the individual indierent between a reduction of one health decit
and working longer is 45=15 = 3 years.
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assuming that the current social security system is constrained-optimal, i.e. that s = 0:187
and R = 1 (retirement at 65) would be selected behind the veil of ignorance given the
current public health system. This provides the estimates A = 34 and  = 0:161. An
interesting question for policy analysis to which we turn now is to determine the jointly
optimal social security and health system for the current health technology (future prospects
are examined in section 7).
6 Currently Optimal Health and Pension Policy
In this section we determine the currently optimal pension and health system simulta-
neously, i.e. we solve the expected welfare maximization problem (29) in the calibrated
model.
6.1 Benchmark Scenario
The rst row of Table 1 displays the status quo before optimization. Results for the
baseline calibration are shown in the second row (\benchmark" Case 2). The best policy is
characterized by a mild increase of health expenditure as a fraction of labor income from
15.5 to 17.4 percent, i.e. by 12%. The health care improvement leads to an increase of
life expectancy at birth, LE, of 0.5 years. Health spending for a younger person shall be
about a fourth of the health spending for an elderly person, a mild decrease compared to
the status quo. Furthermore, individuals still prefer to retire at age 65. Interestingly, the
longer stay in the retirement period because of higher health expenditure (compared to the
status quo) is optimal together with a mildly lower pension contribution rate, s, from 18:7
to 18:5 percent, showing that individuals prefer a healthy life against high consumption
in retirement. The notion will become more apparent in cases with larger deviations of
the optimal policy from the status quo, particularly in section 7 where we analyze the
implications of medical progress. It reects the fact, emphasized by Hall and Jones (2007),
that welfare is linear in the length of life but strictly concave in consumption per period.
Figure 3 shows the impact of the optimal policy on the health decit distribution in
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Figure 3: Decit Distribution in Retirement: Actual vs. Optimal Policy
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Dashed lines: actual policy. Solid lines: optimal pol-
icy.
retirement. For better visibility the gure focusses on the range from zero to ten decits.
(Among the working population the distribution does not visibly change). The largest eect
is observed for those suering one to three health decits. As shown in Table 1 the average
health decits stay at the status quo level for the working-aged while retired persons suer
on average from about 0.16 health decits less.
We also computed how much the \value of life" (in monetary terms) changes after a
policy reform. The value of life is typically measured as life-time welfare divided by the
marginal utility of consumption. For simplicity, we refer to the rate of change in life-time
welfare W as the percentage change of the value of life, W=W . That is, we evaluate the
marginal utility of consumption at the same consumption level before and after the reform.
Alternatives would not be better justied in view of the ex post heterogeneity of agents in
our model. Going from the status quo to the benchmark case raises the value of life in a
negligible fashion, W=W  0 (not reported in Table 1). Thus, the benchmark scenario
suggests that the current social insurance system in Germany is approximately optimal.
To understand how the previous numerical results depend on the baseline calibration,
we now examine the eects of (not necessarily realistic) parameter changes. In order to
ensure comparability with the benchmark case we re-calibrated in all subsequent cases the
value of  such retirement at age 65 remains optimal given the new parameter values and
the status quo health system.
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6.2 The Impact of Health on Disutility from Work
We start with varying , the parameter of which we perhaps know the least. Case 3
investigates the optimal policy when health decits do not aect the disutility from work
at the extensive margin ( = 0). Naturally, health in working age plays a less important
role and the optimal solution is at the corner, h1 = 0. The current health contribution
rate, however, still appears to be close to optimal and life expectancy increases by 0.3 years
compared to status quo. Given the higher importance of old age, individuals prefer to raise
pension contributions as a fraction of labor income to 19.1 percent. Case 4 considers  = 4,
which means that individuals are willing to work four years longer for a reduction of one
health decit. In this case it is optimal to further increase the health contribution rate by
4.8 percentage points from the status quo level and shift the health spending structure to
the working aged. As a result life expectancy increases by almost a year.
6.3 Labor Supply Elasticities
According to our calibration strategy based on (39), the labor supply elasticities and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution cannot be modied independently. Case 5 in Table
1 shows results for  = 0:3 (instead of 0.58) and keeping " at benchmark value. This implies
 = 0:7, a value close to or below the lower end of empirical estimates. The dominating
eect here is the reduced curvature of the utility function, implying that individuals now
prefer to spend less on health and consume more during retirement by raising the pension
savings rate to about 20 percent. In particular, it is optimal behind the veil of ignorance
to spend nothing at working age and consequently die somewhat earlier than in the status
quo scenario.
By contrast, in Case 6, a value of  = 0:9 implies  = 1:1, i.e. a relatively minor
increase in curvature of the utility function. There is a pronounced impact on preferred
health expenditure, in particular in old age. The optimal health contribution rate,  h , rises
to 18.8 percent along with a reduction of the optimal pension savings rate,  s , to 17.8
percent. The optimal retirement age basically remains at 65 years.
In Case 7 we keep  = 0:58 from the baseline calibration and set " = 0:05, a value
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closer to the estimates of the labor supply elasticity of single men (Bargain et al., 2014).
The implied value of  is 1.3, which causes a signicant increase in the curvature of the
utility function. As a result it is now optimal to drastically increase health spending such
that individuals live for 2.3 years longer than in the status quo case and 1.8 years longer
than in the benchmark scenario. Again, the optimal retirement age responds only mildly,
increasing to 65.3 years. The optimal savings rate,  s , on the other hand, declines more
pronouncedly from the status quo compared to the benchmark case, as a response to the
greatly increased health contribution rate and the associated tax distortions of labor supply.
Finally, we investigate with Case 8 the role of pure leisure preference for retirement
by increasing  from 0.25 to 0.5. Consequently, the optimal age of retirement interacts
more strongly with health spending, which both rise substantially. The optimal health
contribution,  h , rises to 21.7 percent, along with a fall in 

s to 15 percent. The optimal
retirement age increases by 2.4 years, about one year more than life expectancy. The
reduction in the expected number of health decits is associated with an increase in health
inequality.
Table 1: Optimal Health and Pension Policy
Case h1=h2 h s R LE E(n1) E(n2) Gini1 Gini2
1) status quo 0.29 15.5 18.7 65.0 78.5 1.41 5.77 0.45 0.36
2) benchmark 0.26 17.4 18.5 65.0 79.0 1.41 5.61 0.45 0.36
3)  = 0 0 15.4 19.1 65.0 78.8 1.50 5.69 0.44 0.37
4)  = 4 0.71 20.3 16.8 65.8 79.4 1.29 5.50 0.47 0.36
5)  = 0:3 0 6.2 20.1 64.8 76.8 1.50 6.36 0.44 0.34
6)  = 0:9 0.1 18.8 17.8 64.9 79.0 1.46 5.62 0.45 0.37
7)  = 0:05 0.42 32.1 16.1 65.3 80.8 1.30 5.04 0.47 0.39
8)  = 0:5 0.91 21.7 15.0 67.4 79.8 1.24 5.42 0.48 0.36
9) w = 0:3 0.12 14.6 17.8 64.9 78.4 1.46 5.82 0.45 0.36
10) high tech 2 29.3 12.4 68.9 82.3 1.05 4.64 0.51 0.39
12)  = 0 0.21 18.2 18.5 65.3 79.6 1.41 5.42 0.45 0.38
Policy parameters are jointly set to optimal values. R is the retirement age converted to years, LE
is life expectancy at birth, E(nj) is expected health decits in period j 2 f1; 2g, Ginij is the Gini
coecient for health decits in period j, h and s are expressed in percent; "high tech" corresponds
to the case where all improvement of health for the working-aged from the year 1900 to 2000 can be
attributed to advancement in medical technology.
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6.4 Other Parameters
Our next numerical experiment considers a higher labor tax rate, w = 0:3 (Case 9). As a
consequence, to cope with the high tax distortions of labor supply, the  h and 

s are now
both lower than in the benchmark (Case 2). Per capita health spending is relatively more
concentrated on the elderly and the retirement age is left unchanged.
Case 10 gives us rst insights about the role of medical technology. For that purpose we
now assume that, albeit unrealistically, all improvement in health during the 20th century
can be attributed to medical technology (\high tech" scenario), i.e. we keep 1 at its level
from the year 1900. Fitting the survival curves of Figure 1 requires a re-calibration to
1 = 1:4 and 2 = 1:0. Not surprisingly it is now optimal to further increase health
expenditure, in particular during working age. More health spending implies that the
distribution of health decits shifts to the left. The Markov-feature of health transitions
causes the better health in working age to be transmitted to better health in old age and a
longer life. Optimal policy interventions increase both retirement age and life expectancy by
3.9 years and substantially reduces the expected number of health decits for both groups,
E(n1), E(n2), compared to the status quo. Like in Case 8, this goes along with a signicant
increase in health inequality among both the working aged and the elderly, as measured by
the Gini coecient of health decits. Gini1 and Gini2 increase by ve and three percentage
points, respectively.
Finally, in Case 11 we make the illustrative but empirically refuted assumption that
health decits are irrelevant for labor supply at the intensive margin (by setting  = 0).
Naturally, it is now optimal to shift health expenditure from the young to the elderly.
Moreover, as total labor supply and thus pension income is higher than in the benchmark
scenario, all other things being equal, the distortionary eect of raising the health contribu-
tion rate, h, is lower (see the proof of Proposition 2). It is thus optimal to increase h (and
leave s basically unchanged), leading to a higher life expectancy than in the benchmark
case.
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7 Long-Run Perspectives on Health, Health Inequal-
ity, and Retirement
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the current social insurance system in
Germany is close to optimal unless in the cases where the curvature in the consumption
utility function departs signicantly from log-utility or previous advancements in the health
technology were very eective in boosting 20th century survival rates. In this section we
use the model for out of sample predictions. In particular we are interested in the impact
of future advances in medical technology on the optimal social insurance system and on
health, life expectancy, and health inequality.
7.1 Optimal Response to Medical Improvements Compared to
the Benchmark Run
In Case 1 of Table 2, we consider the model as parameterized for the benchmark run except
that we increase both technology parameters 1 and 2 by factor 1.5. Under the status quo
policy mix, this would correspond to an increase in life expectancy from 78:5 to 80:2 years
(not shown). Under the optimal adjustment of the social insurance system, life expectancy
increases to 82.5 years, another 2.3 years compared to no policy response. Technological
progress makes further health expenditure desirable ( h increases by 7.3 percentage points
compared to the benchmark run, Case 2 in Table 1), in particular for individuals at working
age whose per capita health spending shall become as high as those of the elderly. Similar
to the \high tech" scenario 10 in Table 1, individuals prefer to increase the retirement age
but not to the extent than life expectancy increases. They also prefer a lower savings rate
in order to nance increased health spending without increasing the total burden on labor
income too much (w+ 

s + 

h increases by 4.7 percentage points compared to benchmark).
Our ndings thus suggest that individuals prefer a healthy life against high consumption
in retirement, again reecting the fact that welfare is linear in the length of life but strictly
concave in consumption per period. The last column of Table 2 shows the implied increase
in the value of life. The value of life is predicted to increase by W=W = 3:3 percent, a
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huge amount, recalling that the move from status quo to optimal policy in the benchmark
run (Case 1 to Case 2 in Table 1) improved the value of life by very little.
Table 2: Prediction of Future Trends under Optimal Policy Adjustment
Case tech. h1=h2 h s R LE E(n1) E(n2) Gini1 Gini2
W
W
1)  = 1 equal 1.11 24.7 15.9 67.0 82.5 1.06 4.51 0.51 0.40 3.30
2)  = 1 biased 0.15 17.3 20.7 64.9 81.9 1.44 4.73 0.45 0.42 3.51
3)  = 0 equal 0.4 19.9 19.0 65.1 81.4 1.29 4.83 0.47 0.40 3.35
4)  = 0 biased 0 15.8 21.2 65.0 81.7 1.50 4.81 0.44 0.42 3.66
5)  = 4 equal 1.7 28.0 12.9 69.6 83.2 0.93 4.35 0.54 0.39 4.25
6)  = 4 biased 0.38 19.7 19.4 65.4 82.3 1.36 4.62 0.46 0.42 3.65
Other parameters as for benchmark case. tech. equal: 1 and 2 increase by 50%. tech. biased: no
change of 1, 2 increases by 100%. The last column indicates the welfare gain in percent.
The most interesting result is perhaps that health inequality is predicted to increase
further through medical technological progress accompanied by optimal policy adjustment.
Gini1 and Gini2 are given by 0.51 and 0.4, respectively (without policy adjustment, they
become 0:46 and 0:38 respectively). Figure 4 illustrates why. Solid lines show the decit
distribution for the benchmark case and dashed (red) lines show the future prediction.
Medical technology improves largely the health of those individuals in anyway good health
at the left hand side of the distribution but it has little impact on the right tail. The share
of individuals in full health during working age and those with one or less health decits in
retirement increase substantially.
Case 2 in Table 2 assumes that medical technological progress is age-biased in the sense
that all future advancement concern health in old age only (i.e. better treatment of old age
diseases). We hold 1 constant and assume that 2 doubles. This corresponds to an increase
in life expectancy to 81:2 years without policy adjustment and to 81:9 years with an opti-
mal policy response. Compared to the benchmark, the optimal health contribution rate,  h ,
changes only marginally and health spending shall be shifted more to the elderly. The op-
timal retirement age approximately stays at 65 years and the optimal pension savings rate,
 s , rises by 2.2 percentage points. Lacking technology advancements, health of the young
changes only by little compared to the benchmark run. It deteriorates a bit through the
shift toward old age expenditure. While expected health decits E(n1) increase somewhat,
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Figure 4: Decit Distribution: Benchmark Case vs. Long-Run Prediction
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Solid lines: optimal actual policy mix. Dashed lines: optimal future policy mix when 1 and
2 rise by factor 1.5. Dashed-dotted lines: optimal future policy when 2 rises by factor 2
and 1 stays constant.
Gini1 stays constant. Visually the health distribution at working age cannot be distin-
guished from the benchmark case (it lies invisible behind the solid line in the upper panel
of Figure 4). Health of the elderly improves signicantly. Interestingly, however, E(n2)
is reduced by less than for unbiased technological change, although the elderly experience
more medical improvements than in Case 1 of Table 2. The reason is that retirees benet
only directly from technological change but not indirectly through transmission of better
health from young age to old age. The impact of health transmission can also be seen by the
health distribution in the bottom panel of Figure 4. Dashed-dotted (green) lines visualize
the implications of doubling 2 (and leaving the other parameters unchanged). Due to less
transmission of good health there are actually less individuals in retirement with only a few
health decits than under unbiased technological change (dashed red lines).
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7.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The remaining cases of Table 2 provide some sensitivity analysis with respect to the role of
health decits in disutility function V . For  = 0 both unbiased (Case 3) and age-biased
(Case 4) medical progress induce a smaller optimal response of health spending than for  =
1 considered in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, and consequently life expectancy improves
by less. The pension savings rate shall be higher. With aged-biased progress, average health
decits of the young actually increases by even more compared to the benchmark case due
to the shift of health expenditure to the elderly, and health inequality among the young is
slightly lower than in Case 2. For  = 4 (Cases 5 and 6), on the other hand, optimal health
spending induced by technological progress should increase more relative to the benchmark
than for  = 1 and the pension savings rate shall be lower in order to limit tax distortions
of labor supply. In case of unbiased technological change the desired retirement age also
rises signicantly, to almost 70 years, reecting the substantially better health of workers
that leads to an increase of life expectancy to 83.2 years. This is also the case that leads to
the greatest improvement of the expected value of life and the greatest increase in health
inequality among the working-aged.
7.3 Summary of Results
Summarizing, our analysis suggests that substantially increasing the health expenditure
share can be regarded as optimal when medical technology improves. We have also consid-
ered the implications on the distribution of health and the jointly optimal responses of the
social security system. While individuals want to exploit the possibility to prolong life by
increasing the health contribution rate, they prefer to lower the pensions savings rate at the
same time, accompanied by a higher retirement age. Also interestingly, more health spend-
ing, as a rule, leads to more health inequality. The reason is that thanks to the powerful
health technology there are large gains in life expectancy for those who developed only a
small number of health decits. For the unlucky individuals at the right end of the health
decit distribution, however, health technology is still to weak in order to improve their
health substantially. Stated dierently, medical technological progress { with or without
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an optimal response from a social welfare point of view { is predicted to increase health
inequality. Our analysis also shows that, in most cases, individuals prefer to increase the
retirement age by a smaller factor than life expectancy, thus re-scaling the life-cycle towards
relatively more leisure.
8 Conclusion
We integrated into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic process of individual
ageing to investigate theoretically and quantitatively the interaction between health and
retirement policy for welfare and for health inequality. In particular, we derived the optimal
design of the social insurance system behind the veil of ignorance.
First, we have shown that the optimal allocation of health spending between working-
aged individuals and retirees is typically biased towards workers compared to the allocation
that maximizes life expectancy. The result reects the dependency of labor supply on the
health status of workers, with eects on the social insurance budgets.
Our results from the calibrated model for Germany suggest that, currently, the PAYG
health and pension system is approximately optimal. The result is most sensitive to the
coecient of relative risk aversion, a parameter that fortunately has been pinned down
well in the literature. Further improvements in the medical technology that raise life ex-
pectancy would call for potentially drastic increases in the health contribution rate. In
case of unbiased medical progress, increased health spending shall be accompanied with
potentially pronounced decreases in the pension savings rate, suggesting that individuals
prefer a healthy and longer life against high consumption in retirement. The result reects
that life-time utility is linear in the length of life but concave in consumption per period.
Typically, the retirement age should increase proportionally less than life expectancy.
Another important insight is that higher health spending typically raises health inequal-
ity. This result is interesting in view of the debate on the distribution of health status in
the population. For instance, the WHO explicitly aims at reducing \avoidable" health in-
equity that it is \attributable to the external environment and conditions mainly outside
the control of the individuals concerned". Abstracting from behavioral decisions that may
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aect individual health, our analysis suggests that this goal may be in conict with welfare
maximization of ex ante identical individuals behind the veil of ignorance. The result is
driven by the fact that higher health spending helps those who are relatively healthy more
than those who have accumulated a rather high number of health decits already.
In future research we plan to endogenize the health technology, again in a model of health
decit accumulation that captures the basic stylized facts from gerontology research.18 For
instance, it is interesting to investigate how the incentive to innovate in the pharmaceutical
sector interacts with the social insurance system. A framework with biologically founded
human ageing would also allow us to examine to which degree health innovations should
be promoted vis-a-vis non-health innovations.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Dene z  (h1; h; s; R). We need to establish that at an interior solution to (38), z 
(h1; 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h ; 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s ;
R), the following holds: (i) If 0 = 0 and V does not depend on n1, then
@~n2(z
)=@h1 = 0; (ii) if 0 > 0 or @V=@n1 > 0, then @~n2(z)=@h1 > 0. To see this, let us
dene u^(z)  u(z; ~n2(z)), (z; n2)  @u(z; n2)=@n2 and ^(z)  (z; ~n2(z)). Using (37), we
obtain the following partial derivatives of u^(z) with respect to h1 and 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[(C1)
 w^   ~l1=| {z }]
=0, acc. to (6)
  0
~l1+1=
1 + 1=
1CA ~a01+
e  R   e  ~T (n2)

(C2)
  Rws
~T (n2)  R
@~l
@n1
~a01  
@V
@n1
~a01; (43)
18In a recent paper, Grossmann (2013) studies the role of institutional regulations in the pharmaceutical
sector and co-insurance schemes in the health system on pharmaceutical innovations. However, he does
not capture the interactions with the social security system and does not endogenize life expectancy.
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@u^
@h
= ^
@~n2
@h
  1  e
  R

@~l
@w^
w[(C1)
 w^   ~l1=| {z }]
=0, acc. to (6)
 
e  R   e  ~T (n2)

(C2)
  Rsw
~T (n2)  R
@~l
@w^
w; (44)
where we used the fact @w^=@h =  w in (44). Also note that (C1) w^ = ~l1=, according
to (6). According to (34), we have
@~n2
@h1
= ~a02
@~h2
@h1
+ b~a01; (45)
@~n2
@h
=
@~h2
@h
~a02; (46)
At the optimum, there cannot be Laer eects, i.e. @~h2=@h  0. Thus, (46) and ~a02 < 0
imply that
@~n2(z
)
@h
 0: (47)
Hence, at an interior solution z to (38), where @u^(z)=@h = 0, we have
^(z) < 0; (48)
according to (43). Recall that @~l=@n1 < (=)0 if and only if 
0 > (=)0. By denition of z,
@u^(z)=@h1 = 0. The properties thus follow from (43), (48) and ~a01 < 0. This concludes the
proof.
References
Bargain, Olivier, Kristian Orsini and Andreas Peichl, 2014, Labor Supply Elasticities in
Europe and the US, Journal of Human Resources 49, 723-838.
Becker, Gary, 2007. Health as Human Capital: Synthesis and Extensions, Oxford Economic
Papers 59, 379-410.
41
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson and Brigitte C. Madrian, 2009, The Impor-
tance of Default Options for Retirement Saving Outcomes: Evidence from the United
States, in: Brown, Jerey, Jerey Liebman and David A. Wise (eds.), Social Security
Policy in a Changing Environment, University of Chicago Press.
Bloom, David E., David Canning and Michael Moore, 2014, Optimal Retirement with
Increasing Longevity, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 3, 838{858.
Borsch-Supan, Axel and Reinhold Schnabel, 1998, Social Security and Declining Labor-
Force Participation in Germany, American Economic Review 88, 173-178.
Borsch-Supan, Axel, Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Michela Coppola and Bettina Lamla, 2015,
Savings in Times of Demographic Change: Lessons from the German Experience, Journal
of Economic Surveys 29, 807{829.
Case, Anne and Agnus Deaton, 2005, Broken Down by Work and Sex: How Our Health
Declines, in: David Wise (ed.), Analyses in the Economics of Aging, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Cai, Lixin, Kostas Mavromaras and Umut Oguzoglu, 2014, The Eects of Health and Health
Shocks on Hours Worked, Health Economics 23, 516{528.
Caliendo, Frank and T. Scott Findley, 2013, Limited Computational Ability and Social
Security, International Tax and Public Finance 20, 414-433.
Chetty, Raj, 2006, A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion, American Economic Review
96, 1821-1834.
Chetty, Raj, 2015, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective,
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 115.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Dayanand S. Manoli and Andrea Weber, 2011a, Does Indivisible
Labor Explain the Dierence Between Micro and Macro Elasticities? A Meta-Analysis
of Extensive Margin Elasticities, NBER Working Paper No. 16729.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Dayanand S. Manoli and Andrea Weber, 2011b, Are Micro and
Macro Labor Supply Elasticities Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and
Extensive margins, American Economic Review 101, 471-475.
42
Conesa, Juan C. and Dirk Krueger, 1999, Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous
Agents, Review of Economic Dynamics 2, 757-795.
Conesa, Juan C., Sagiri Kitao and Dirk Krueger, 2009, Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea
After All!, American Economic Review 99, 25-48.
Corneo, Giacomo, Matthias Keese, Carsten Schroder, 2009, The Riester Scheme and Private
Savings: An Empirical Analysis based on the German SOEP, Journal of Applied Social
Science Studies 129, 321-332.
Cutler, David and Ellen Meara, 2001, Changes in the Age Distribution of Mortality Over
the 20th Century, NBER Working Paper No. 8556.
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan and Holger Strulik, 2012, The Genesis of the Golden Age { Ac-
counting for the Rise in Health and Leisure, University of Copenhagen Discussion Paper
12-10.
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan and Holger Strulik, 2014, Optimal Aging and Death: Understanding
the Preston Curve, Journal of the European Economic Association 12, 672{701.
Ehrlich, Isaac and Hiroyuki Chuma, 1990, A Model of the Demand for Longevity and the
Value of Life Extension, Journal of Political Economy 98, 761-782.
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, 2009, The Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution:
New Evidence from 401 (k) Participation, Economics Letters 103, 15-17.
Feldstein, Martin and Jerey B. Liebman, 2002, Social Security, in: A. J. Auerbach and M.
Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 4, Ch. 32, pp. 2245-2324, Elsevier.
Fogel, Robert W., 1994, Economic Growth, Population Theory, and Physiology: The Bear-
ing of Long-term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy, American Economic
Review 84, 369{395.
French, Eric and John B. Jones, 2011, The Eects of Health Insurance and Self-insurance
on Retirement Behavior, Econometrica 79, 693-732.
Fries, James F., 1980, Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity, New
England Journal of Medicine 303, 130-135.
43
Galama, Titus J., Arie Kapteyn, Raquel Fonseca and Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2013, A Health
Production Model with Endogenous Retirement, Health Economics 22, 883{902.
Gavrilov, Leonid A. and Natalia S. Gavrilova, 1991, The Biology of Human Life Span: A
Quantitative Approach, Harwood Academic Publishers, London.
Grossman, Michael, 1972, On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health,
Journal of Political Economy 80, 223-255.
Grossmann, Volker, 2013, Do Cost-Sharing and Entry Deregulation Curb Pharmaceutical
Innovation?, Journal of Health Economics 32, 881-894.
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones, 2007, The Value of Life and the Rise in Health
Spending, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 39{72.
Hartley, Roger, Gauthier Lanot and Ian Walker, 2013, Who Really Wants to be a Million-
aire? Estimates of Risk Aversion from Gameshow Data, Journal of Applied Econometrics
29, 861-879.
Harttgen, Ken, Paul Kowal, Holger Strulik, Somnath Chatterji and Sebastian Vollmer,
2013, Patterns of Frailty in Older Adults, PLOS ONE 8 (10).
Heijdra, Ben J. and Ward E. Romp, 2009, Retirement, Pensions, and Aging, Journal of
Public Economics 93, 586{604.
Imrohoroglu, Ayse, Selahattin Imrohoroglu and Douglas H. Joines, 1995, A Life Cycle
Analysis of Social Security, Economic Theory 6, 83-114.
Imrohoroglu, Selahattin and Sagiri Kitao, 2012, Social Security Reforms: Benet Claiming,
Labor Force Participation, and Long-run Sustainability, American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics 4, 96-127.
Jaag, Christian, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, 2010, Pension Reform, Re-
tirement, and Life-cycle Unemployment, International Tax and Public Finance 17, 556-
585.
Jaag, Christian, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, 2011, Aging and the Fi-
nancing of Social Security in Switzerland, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics
147, 181-231.
44
Leroux, Marie-Louise, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere, 2011a, Longevity, Genes and
Eorts: An Optimal Taxation Approach to Prevention, Journal of Health Economics 30,
62-76.
Leroux, Marie-Louise, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere, 2011b, Optimal Linear Tax-
ation under Endogenous Longevity, Journal of Population Economics 24, 213-237.
Masoro, Edward J., 2006, Are Age-Associated Diseases an Integral Part of Aging?, in:
Masoro, E. J. and S. N. Austad (eds.), Handbook of the Biology of Aging, Academic
Press.
McKeown, Thomas, 1976, The Modern Rise of Population, New York: Academic Press.
Milligan, Kevin S. and David A. Wise, 2011, Social Security and Retirement Around the
World: Historical Trends in Mortality and Health, Employment, and Disability Insur-
ance Participation and Reforms - Introduction and Summary, NBER Working Paper No.
16719.
Mitnitski, Arnold B., Alexander J. Mogilner, Chris MacKnight and Kenneth Rockwood,
2002a, The Accumulation of Decits with Age and Possible Invariants of Aging. Scientic
World 2, 1816-1822.
Mitnitski, Arnold B., Alexander J. Mogilner, Chris MacKnight and Kenneth Rockwood,
2002b, The Mortality Rate as a Function of Accumulated Decits in a Frailty Index,
Mechanisms of Ageing and Development 123, 1457-1460.
Mitnitski, Arnold B., Xiaowei Song, Ingmar Skoog, I., Gerald A. Broe, Jafna L. Cox, Eva
Grunfeld and Kenneth Rockwood, 2005, Relative Fitness and Frailty of Elderly Men and
Women in Developed Countries and their Relationship with Mortality. Journal of the
American Geriatrics Society 53, 2184{2189.
Mitnitski, Arnold B., Le Bao and Kenneth Rockwood, 2006, Going from Bad to Worse:
A Stochastic Model of Transitions in Decit Accumulation, in Relation to Mortality,
Mechanisms of Ageing and Development 127, 490-493.
45
Mitnitski, Arnold B., Le Bao, Ingmar Skoog and Kenneth Rockwood, 2007a, A Cross-
National Study of Transitions in Decit Counts in Two Birth Cohorts: Implications for
Modeling Ageing, Experimental Gerontology 42, 241-246.
Mitnitski, Arnold B., Xiaowei Song and Kenneth Rockwood, 2007b, Improvement and
Decline in Health Status from Late Middle Age: Modeling Age-Related Changes in Decit
Accumulation, Experimental Gerontology 42, 1109-1115.
OECD, 2015, Taxing Wages 2015, OECD, Paris.
Oeppen, Jim and James W. Vaupel, 2002, Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, Science 296,
1029{1031.
Pestieau, Pierry, Gregory Ponthiere and Motohiro Sato, 2008, Longevity, Health Spending,
and Pay-As-You-Go Pensions, FinanzArchiv 64, 1-18.
Philipson, Tomas J. and Gary S. Becker, 1998, Old-Age Longevity and Mortality-Contingent
Claims, Journal of Political Economy 106, 551{573.
Poterba, James M., 2014, Retirement Security in an Aging Society, NBER Working Paper
No. 19930.
Rockwood, Kenneth and Arnold B. Mitnitski, 2007, Frailty in Relation to the Accumulation
of Decits, Journals of Gerontology Series A: Biological and Medical Sciences 62, 722-
727.
Sanso, Marcos and Rosa M. Asa, 2006, Endogenous Longevity, Biological Deterioration
and Economic Growth, Journal of Health Economics 25, 555-578.
Searle, Samuel D., Arnold B. Mitnitski, Eveline A. Gahbauer, Thomas M. Gill and Kenneth
Rockwood, 2008, A Standard Procedure for Creating a Frailty Index, BMC Geriatrics
8:24, 1-10.
Sinn, Hans Werner, 1995, A Theory of the Welfare State, Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 97, 495-526.
Strulik, Holger, 2010, The Mechanics of Aging and Death - A Primer for Economists, Part
II: Measuring Ageing, LEPAS Working Paper No. 2.
46
Strulik, Holger, 2013, Health and Education: Understanding the Gradient, Cege Discussion
Papers No. 172.
Strulik, Holger and Sebastian Vollmer, 2013, Long-Run Trends of Human Aging and
Longevity, Journal of Population Economics 26, 1303-1323.
Wolfe, John R., 1985, A Model of Declining Health and Retirement, Journal of Political
Economy 93, 1258{67.
Word Bank, 2015, World Bank Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.
DYN.LE00.IN/countries?display=default
47
Authors
Volker GROSSMANN
University of Fribourg, Switzerland; CESifo, Munich; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn; Centre for Research and 
Analysis of Migration (CReAM), University College London; Postal address: University of Fribourg, Department of Economics, 
Bd. de Pérolles 90, CH- 1700 Fribourg. E-mail: volker.grossmann@unifr.ch
Holger STRULIK
University of Goettingen. Postal address: University of Goettingen, Department of Economics, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 
37073 Goettingen, Germany; Email: holger.strulik@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de
 
Bd de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg
Tél.: +41 (0) 26 300 82 00
decanat-ses@unifr.ch      www.unifr.ch/ses
Université de Fribourg, Suisse, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales 
Universität Freiburg, Schweiz, Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät 
University of Fribourg, Switzerland, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
Working Papers SES collection
Abstract
This paper integrates into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic process of 
individual ageing. The novel approach enables us to investigate the interaction between health 
and retirement policy in order to quantitatively characterize the optimal joint design of the social 
insurance system today and in response to future medical progress, and its implications for 
health inequality. Calibrating our model to Germany, we find that currently the public health 
and pension system is approximately optimal. Future progress in medical technology calls for a 
potentially drastic increase in health spending that typically shall be accompanied with a lower 
pension savings rate and a higher retirement age. Medical progress and higher health spending 
is predicted to lead to more health inequality.
Citation proposal
Grossmann Volker, Strulik Holger. 2015. «Optimal Social Insurance and Health Inequality». Working Papers SES 464, Faculty 
of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Fribourg (Switzerland)
Jel Classification
H50, I10, C60 
Keywords
Ageing; Health Expenditure; Health Inequality; Social Security System; Retirement Age
Last published
458 Dumas C.: Shocks and child labor: the role of markets; 2015
459 Fricke H., Frölich M., Huber M., Lechner M.: Endogeneity and non-response bias in treatment evaluation - nonparametric 
identification of causal effects by instruments; 2015
460 Grossmann V., Osikominu A., Osterfeld M.: Are Sociocultural Factors Important for Studying a Science University Major?; 
2015
461 Bücker J.J.L.E., Furrer O., Lin Yanyan.: Measuring Cultural Intelligence: A New Test of the CQ Scale; 2015
462 Denisova-Schmidt E., Huber M., Prytula Y.: An Experimental Evaluation of an Anti-Corruption Intervention among Ukrainian 
University Students; 2015
463 Böhm S.: Regional Economic Integration and Factor Mobility in Unified Germany; 2015
 
Catalogue and download links
http://www.unifr.ch/ses/wp                          
http://doc.rero.ch/collection/WORKING_PAPERS_SES 
Publisher
Working Paper 464 november 2015
